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Article 6

Comment
FRANCHISE FULL DISCLOSURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the chain stores system, the marketing phenomenon
called franchising has assisted in the architectural standardization
of modern America's suburban business establishments.' But behind the regimented exterior of the franchise outlet is a new and
extremely popular contractual arrangement that claims to be the
savior of the small businessman. 2 For a fee, the local investor can
own and operate a unit of a proven business enterprise of national
renown and receive expert assistance in making the local unit
profitable.
Franchising has reached its current stage of popularity without
notable conflict with established law except for its fundamental
conflict with antitrust regulations.3 In 1970, however, the federal
and several state governments showed a great deal of concern for
the future of franchising and the protection of the potential franchise investor. The result of the first extensive federal investigation
of franchising was the conclusion that the franchise arrangement
1

2

On the basis of architecture, goods sold, or services rendered, it is not
easy to distinguish between a corporate owned and managed chain
store and an independently owned and operated franchised unit. There
may even be a mix of chain and franchised units behind one facade.
Kentucky Fried Chicken makes more profit on a company owned outlet and has established a policy of "buying back" profitable franchised
units. Burck, Franchising's Troubled Dream World, FORTUNE, March
1970, at 116. The franchising process may be used as a "short-run,
transitory stage for an expanding company." Id. at 121.
The growth of franchising has been astonishing. "Franchising now
accounts for approximately $90 billion in annual sales, or about 10
percent of our country's entire gross national product." Hearings on
the Impact of Franchisingon Small Business Before the Subcomm.
on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Senate Select

Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. It is estimated that 90% of the franchise
companies existing today began after 1954. Burck, supra note 1, at
117. As a result of this growth, it is said that franchising "represents
the best, if possibly not the last, opportunity for the small businessman to survive in our economy." 1970 Hearings 49.
3 "Price fixing, exclusive dealing, tie-ins, territorial allocation, customer
restrictions, price discrimination, monopolization-whatever it may be,
franchising has it, at least potentially." Pollock, Antitrust Problems
in Franchising,15 N.Y.L.F. 106 (1969).

COMMENT
is so unique that its proper development can not be assured under
existing law.4

Although there is no "typical" franchise contract, the franchise
purchaser, or franchisee, is usually required to pay a fee for the
privilege of opening a franchise outlet, and must then rely upon the
franchise seller, the franchisor, to provide guidance and support in
the operation of the enterprise. If the venture fails, the franchisee
may lose his entire investment. 5 In the past, there have been attempts to regulate substantive provisions of franchise agreements
in order to reduce the instances of investment loss by franchisees. 6
The focus of recent concern over franchising practices has not involved the objection to particular contract provisions so much as
the desire to insure that the investing franchisee is aware of the
true nature and scope of the risks he is undertaking. This comment
will trace the extent of regulatory practices, with particular emphasis placed upon recent state and federal legislative proposals that
require full disclosure of material information by the franchisor
prior to any contractual undertaking with a prospective franchisee.
II.

BACKGROUND

As a modern business relationship, franchising has been avidly
denounced 7 and aptly defended,8 but never adequately defined.9
Since any particular arrangement may contain only a modicum of
similarity with any other, the franchising concept is susceptible
only to general description. Essentially, the granting of a franchise
4 Statement of Senator Harrison Williams (Dem. N.J.), 116 CoNG. REc.
7209 (daily ed. May 15, 1970).
5 As a representative case, a New Jersey dentist testified that he lost
$27,000 in one year as an equipment rental franchisee. After accumulating sufficient assets by selling an idea to franchisees, the equipment
rental franchisor went "public." "A million shares were sold at $13.75
each. With over $14 million they embarked upon an aggressive program of corporate acquisitions, buying up one company after another
within a year's time. The price of the stock soared to $54 before a
stock split. Within 21 months of going public, they declared bankruptcy." Statement of Victor J.Nitti, D.D.S., 1970 Hearings 409, 412.
6 For a review of past legislative attempts by Congress, see Zeidman,
Legislative Supervision of the Franchise Contract: Throwing Out the
Baby with the Bath Water?, 15 N.Y.L.F. 19 (1969).
7 H. BROWN, FRANCIsING: TRAP FOR THE TRUSTING (1969).
8 J. ATKINSON, FRANCHISING: THE ODDS-ON FAVORITE (1968), in 1970
Hearings 56.
9 "The word 'franchise' has been applied so indiscriminately, and to
such divergent business arrangements as to defy consistent definition."
Wilson, An Emerging Enforcement Policy for Franchising,15 N.Y.L.F.
1, 2 (1969). For an insight into what a franchise contract might entail,
see Van Cise, A Franchise Contract, in 1970 Hearings 277.
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is the granting of a license, but with the added interest of the franchisee in the continued assistance of the franchisor. 10
This continuing relationship between franchisor and franchisee
is important to both parties. The franchisee may be entirely dependent upon the franchisor's guidance, but most often he is also
seeking to maintain some degree of independence. Besides having
contractual obligations to aid the franchisee, in most instances the
franchisor is obligated to oversee the conduct of the franchisee at
least to the extent of protecting the public from the possible misuse of the franchisor's trademark, trade name or service mark.11
But as the franchisor's degree of control over the franchisee increases the risk of an antitrust violation increases, 12 and some have
argued that the degree of control may reach the point where the
relationship qualifies as that of principal and agent. 8 In a recent
landmark decision, a Canadian court held that a franchise relationship was in fact a fiduciary relationship that had many attributes
of a partnership. 4
Being a relationship founded upon trust and cooperation, a bilateral evaluation of capability to perform and establish a successful operation would appear to be a prerequisite to any agreement.
Unfortunately, many enterprising franchisors conceal the information a prospective franchisee would need to make an intelligent decision as to the investment risks involved in the franchise. They
hide the fact of their undercapitalization in misleading accounting
methods that treat franchise fees as income when in actuality the
fees have been obligated for the further expansion of franchise
operations.'0 They refuse to provide facts concerning their history,
the names of other franchisees, and their future intentions relating
to the franchise operation. Some franchisors purposely overesti10 "Basically, a franchise is a license. But it's much more than that. It's

a continuing commercial relationship (either of a definite or indefinite duration) in a particular area under which one person (the franchisee) is given the right to offer, sell and distribute (1) goods manufactured, processed or distributed, or (2) services organized and directed, by the other person (the franchisor). The franchise is associated with the franchisor's trademark, trade name, some service mark
or commercial symboL" CCH Corp. Fomvs
177 (1970).
11 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964) (requires the registration
of and regulates the use of trade marks used in commerce).
12 Pollock, supra note 3, at 107.
'3 Note, Liability of a Franchisorfor Acts of the Franchisee, 41 S. CAL.
L. REV. 143 (1967); Note, A Franchisor'sLiability for the Torts of His
Franchisee,5 U. SAw. FRAN. L. REv. 118 (1970).
'4 Jirna Ltd. v. Mister Donut of Canada Ltd., 3 Ont. 629 (1970). See also
3

CONTInENTAL FTANCMSE

REV., Sept. 7, 1970, at 6.

15 Burck, supra note 1, at 121.

COMMVIENT
mate expected profits and underestimate the efforts required of the
franchisee in order to make the business successful.16 The techniques franchisors have used to distort reality are limitless, but few
have presented disenchanted franchisees with cases of actionable
17
fraud and misrepresentation against the franchise promoters.
The practices of some franchisors have met criticism for several
years, but until recently there has been an attitude of hesitancy
toward governmental interference with the offer and sale of franchises. One consideration has been the desire to preserve contracting
freedom.' 8 Many also feared a snuffing of the economic spark that
franchising has provided, and the destruction of the small businessman's last bastion.' It has been argued that the promise franchising
offers minority groups to participate more actively in the economy
is another reason for not imposing restrictions on franchising's development. 20 However, the purpose and effect of full disclosure
legislation does not run contrary to any of these considerations. A
full disclosure of material facts concerning the franchise that is

being offered for sale will not retard the growth of franchising or
interfere with contractual freedom, but will merely "provide each
prospective franchisee with the information necessary to21 make an
intelligent decision regarding franchises being offered."

16 The equipment rental franchisee mentioned in note 5 supra found
the operation involved much more effort than expected and his first
year gross income to be only "a shade above 50% of the franchisor's
projection." 1970 Hearings 409.
17 Brown, supra note 7, at 35-38. See generally Developments in the Law
-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1017 (1967).
38 In 1968, the American Bar Association expressed opposition to any
legislation "designed to restrict the freedom of franchisors and franchisees to contract .

. . ."

Proceedings of the House of Delegates:

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 5-8, 1968, 54 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1029
(1968).
19 "The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the standpoint of our American system of competitive economy, of enabling
numerous groups of individuals with small capital to become entrepreneurs ....

20
21

If our economy had not developed that system of opera-

tion these individuals would have turned out to have been merely employees." Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
af'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted,381 U.S. 125 (1965).
Sayre, Franchisingin the Ghetto, 25 Bus. LAw. 73 (Special Issue 1969).
Statement of Hon. Clark L. Bradley, California State Senator, 1970
Hearings595, 599.
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III. CORRECTIVE FORCES

A.

SELF REGULATION

The majority of franchisors, those that have made the system
so successful, have recognized the need to expose fraudulent and
unethical franchisors to prospective franchisees. These more reputable franchisors do not fear a disclosure of material facts, but encourage the franchisee's full understanding of obligations and risks.
They have attempted to remove the undesirables from their ranks,
but have found self regulation to be extremely difficult.
The International Franchise Association, the leading organization of franchisors, has a Code of Ethics that its members are expected to support, and has taken other steps to promote ethical
conduct in franchising.22 An excellent trade publication, Continental
FranchiseReview, 23 has pleaded for self regulation from within the
franchising system and has its own policy of challenging questionable franchise operations. 24 Major newspapers and business magazines have voluntarily established various procedures aimed at
preventing distorted promotional materials used by some franchisors
from receiving the implied support of their publications. 25 But the
concerted efforts at private regulation have not been effective and
most authorities and leading franchisors look to some form of governmental assistance.

B. FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssION
Some authorities argue that the federal government has sufficient
power at the present time to regulate fraudulent franchising prac26
tices, and that full disclosure legislation is therefore unnecessary.
They look to the Federal Trade Commission and its power to eliminate "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 27 The commission has had
several years' experience in protecting the public from deceptive
business practices, and recently special attention has been given to
franchising. 28 A study of selected franchisors has been initiated,
1970 Hearings 584.
"By far, the best publication in the franchising field." Blackford, Book
Review, 40 CLEV. B.J. 239 (1969).
24 Statement of Thomas H. Murphy, Publisher, CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE
REv., 1970 Hearings 204. See also 3 CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REv. July
20, 1970, at 4.
25 1970 Hearings 506, 572-90.
26 1970 Hearings 195, 222. See also Zeidman, The FTC Act as a Franchise
Disclosure Law, 3 CONTINENTAL FRANCHISE REv., August 10, 1970, at 7.
27 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1964).
28 Statement of John V. Buffington, General Counsel, Federal Trade
22
23

Commission, 1970 Hearings309.
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and, "on the basis of its study, the FTC will consider guidance for
the industry to follow in framing contracts and carrying them out,
and in advertising franchising opportunities to the public .... 29
In a recent complaint and subsequent consent order,30 the Commission required a franchisor to provide each future prospect with
relevant information "reasonably prior to such persons agreeing
to become franchisees." In oral statements and promotional materials, the franchisor had distorted facts concerning the personal
qualities a franchisee must have to succeed, the difficulties to be
expected in selling the product, the success of previous franchisees,
and the expectation of substantial income. The order from the
Commission required that the franchisor perform a good faith
evaluation of the prospective franchisee's ability to succeed in the
undertaking since successful operation of the franchise was dependent upon specific personality and communications skills. The
franchisor was also required to furnish precise information concerning the number of successful franchisees, the number of franchise outlets planned, the number terminated, and gross sales
figures.
Although the Federal Trade Commission has initiated a policy
of increased surveillance of franchising practices, the question
seems to be whether it is capable of effectively policing the broad
spectrum of franchising abuses. While the FTC changes from "tennis shoes to cleats" in regard to franchising, other means of regulation are being pursued.
C. SEcuI TmIs LAWS
Some have suggested that the offer and sale of franchises be
subjected to state and federal securities regulations. 31 They see no
reason why the franchisor should be given preferential treatment
in the competition for the public's capital since most other competitors must comply with securities regulations in order to acquire

29 TRADE REG. REP.

No. 465, May 11, 1970, at 1.

Success Motivation Institute, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. 1 19,029 at 21,280 (FTC 1969); [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
TRADE: REG. REP.
19,259, at 21,421 (FTC 1970). See also Universal
Electronics Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,390, at 21,515 (FTC 1970).
31 Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchising Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the California Corporation Code, 44 Los AxGELES B. BuLL. 555
(1969); Goodwin, Franchisingin the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including 10b-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1969). But see Coleman, A FranchiseAgreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities Law of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW.
493 (1967).
30
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needed capital. 32 However, most courts have rejected the argument
33
that the franchise is a security.
A few state securities agencies have attempted to regulate the
offer and sale of some of the more "security-like" franchises3 The
State of California was the first to try, but it soon found that adequate protection was not being given to most prospective franchisees.3 5 The Securities Exchange Commission has not made the
attempt, 36 but some have argued that it37 could do so easily and provide uniform and effective regulation.
Several suits have been brought in federal courts on the theory
that a franchise is a security and therefore subject to the Securities
Act of 1933,38 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 39 and the liberal
anti-fraud provisions of S.E.C. Rule 10b-5. 40 Although it is reported
that several 10b-5 suits have been settled out of court for large
amounts, 41 as of this writing, a 42
$100,000 suit by a franchisee is pending in a federal district court.
In view of the legislation to be discussed, the mental gymnastics
involved in calling a franchise a security seems to be totally unnecessary. However, awaiting progressive legislation, the security
argument may serve the individual case and securities agencies may
develop the means to adequately police franchising activities.
32 Goodwin, supra note 31, at 1312.
33 See, e.g., Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.
1970); Georgia MVkt. Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d
620 (1969); Gaflion v. Alabama ikt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213
So. 2d 841 (1968). For an example of a franchise qualifying as a se34

35

36

37

38
39

curity, see Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693
(Fla. 1969).
State attempts at applying their securities regulations to franchising
have been too involved to be discussed in this article. For further discussion, see Green, The Regulation of FranchisingUnder the Securities Laws, 6 GA. ST. B.J. 357 (1970); Pierno, Franchise Regulations,
The Need for a New Approach, 44 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 501 (1969).
Pierno, supra note 34.
"[Ilf disclosure is to be obtained in the franchising area, this should
be done by the enactment of separate legislation rather than, as has
been suggested, by simply changing the definition of security in the
Securities Act so as to make a franchise a security thereunder." Statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1970 Hearings706, 710.
Goodwin, The Name of the FranchisingGame Is: The Franchise Fee,
The Celebrity or Basic Operations?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1418 (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1964).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1964).

40

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).

41

Goodwin, supra note 37.
Bergener v. Diners/Fugazy Travel, Inc., Cause No. 69C2183 (N.D. Ill.,

42

filed Nov. 22, 1969).
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IV. PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION
A. FEDFaAL ACTION
Hearings were held early in 1970 by the Senate Subcommittee
on Urban and Rural Economic Development of the Select Committee on Small Business to investigate "The Impact of Franchising
on Small Business. '43 After investigating both sides of the franchisor-franchisee relationship in depth, it was found that:
[In consequence of fraud and other practices, numerous purchasers of business franchises have suffered substantial losses as a
result of the failure or omission by franchisors to provide full and
complete disclosure concerning the prior business experience of
the franchisor, the nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship,
the nature of the franchise contract, the prospects of the franchised
business and other facts essential to a businessman's determina44
tion of the desirability and profitability of the franchise.

The resulting legislative proposal, "The Franchise Full Disclosure
Act of 1970" (S.3844), was introduced by Senator Harrison Williams
(Dem. N.J.) 4r and would require not only that disclosure be made,
but that the franchises be registered with the Securities Exchange
Commission, unless specifically exempted by Commission ruling.46
The Williams Bill is constructed along the lines of the Securities
Act of 193347 and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of
1968.48 One of the most difficult problems with any legislation in
the franchise area has been the defining of franchise. The Williams
Bill's definition includes what seems to be two common elements
of any franchise arrangement, the payment of a fee by the franchisee and reliance on the franchisor for support and guidance. 49
43 1970 Hearings.

44 S.3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
45 116 CONG. REc.7208 (daily ed. May 15,1970).
46 S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1970).
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1964).
4& 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (Supp. V, 1970).
49 S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Section 3(3) provides: "The
term 'franchise' means a contract or agreement, either expressed or
implied, oral or written, between two or more persons under which
(A) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a marketing
plan or system prescribed in substantial part by the franchisor, (B)
the operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such plan or
system is substantially associated with the franchisor's trademark,
service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other commercial
symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate and (C) the franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee. Unless specifically stated otherwise, such term includes an area franchise as hereinafter defined."
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The application for registration with the Commission must contain the specific business data required by the bill 0° and any additional information that the Commission may decide is necessary. 51
Leaving an open end as to disclosure requirements allows the Commission to close any "fresh traps" that franchisors might develop.
Disclosure must also be made to each prospective franchisee fortyeight hours prior to any contractual undertaking.5 2 This provision
would counteract "pressure" sales tactics and give the prospective
franchisee ample time to consult an attorney. If this provision is
the contract entered into is voidable at the franchisee's
violated,
55
option.
It would be unlawful for a franchisor or his agent to use any
means of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or the mails to sell franchises unless the franchise was (1) registered and a prospectus was properly submitted to the franchisee,
and (2) the sale was made without the use of fraudulent devices,
material misrepresentations, or any practice "which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a franchisee." 54 It would
appear that the "federal common law of corporate responsibility" 55
that has developed with Rule 10b-5 could be applied to this bill to
ease the proof requirements for fraud or deceit.
The civil liability provision of the bill would allow the franchisee
to collect treble damages. 56 Criminal penalties for any willful violation establish the possibility of $5,000 fines, five years imprisonment, or both.57 The bill would allow the states to exercise jurisdiction over franchising,5" has provisions for the determination of
federal court jurisdiction concurrent with state court jurisdiction,
and denies the removal to federal court of any action brought under
the bill in a state court of competent jurisdiction. 59 There are also
provisions requiring that the Commission be provided with an irrevocable power of attorney to accept service of process in any
civil action brought under the provisions of the bill.60
Probably the most important part of the bill is the schedule of
information that must be disclosed to the Commission and prospec50 See Appendix.

51 S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1970).
52 Id.
53 Id.

§ 5(b).

5 Id. § 5 (a).
z5 Goodwin, supra note 31, at 1312.
6 S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1970).
57 Id. § 20.
5S Id. § 11.
59 Id. § 18.

-60 Id.

§ 22.
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tive franchisees. 6 ' With this information, the franchisee will know
the character, background, experience, and financial status of the
franchisor. 62 Disclosure of the nature and extent of fees that will
be required of the franchisee will provide a better forecast of the
profitability of the franchise. 63 Knowing what equipment, supplies,
and services will be necessary "by the terms of the franchise agreement or by other device or practice" will also give greater insight
of the future.Y The past practice of some franchisors has been to
spring undisclosed fees upon the franchisee, or coerce the franchisee
into equipment, service, or supply purchases that were not disclosed in the franchise contract.6 5
The federal legislation attempts to further the franchisee's evaluation of the investment risk in other areas. Although termination
and "buy back" procedures are not directly regulated by the bill,
these procedures must be explained fully in the prospectus." Franchisees have argued, often unsuccessfully, that termination provisions allowing the franchisor to terminate the franchise without
cause were unconscionable. 67 With disclosure required the franchisee should be aware of the conditions upon which he might lose
his franchise.
The terms of any financial arrangement to be offered by the
franchisor and any intent the franchisor has to sell or assign any
obligation of the franchisee must also be disclosed.6 8 The franchisee
must be told facts concerning the past success, present operation,
and future plans of franchises under the franchisor's control. 9 Another interesting disclosure provision would require stating the
compensation given to a "public figure" for the use of his name in
the name or symbol of the franchise.70
61 Id. Schedule A; see Appendix.
62 Id. Schedule A (3) to (6).
6 Id. (8) and (9).
4 Id. (11).
65 See generally Brown, supra note 7.
66 S.3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Schedule A (10) (1970); see Appendix.
67 The classic case is Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969). See also
Hewitt, Termination of Dealer Franchises and the Code-Mixing
Classified and Coordinated Uncertainty with Conflict, 22 Bus. LAW.
1075 (1967); Note, Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code and
Franchise DistributionAgreements, 1969 DuKE L. J.959 (1969).
68 S.3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Schedule A (13) and (14) (1970); see
Appendix.
69 Id. (15) and (16).
70 Id. (20). See also Statement of Joe Namath, 1970 Hearings 300: "In
other words, my own future and that of the company, Broadway
Joe's, are one and the same." And it has come to pass, leaving behind
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Except for provisions allowing the Commission to require additional information at its discretion and allowing the franchisor to
add any that he wishes, 7 1 the last two provisions of importance require the franchisor to disclose (1) whether the franchisee is
limited to the goods and services he can offer, and (2) 2whether
7
the franchisee will receive an exclusive area or territory.
It would seem that a discussion of proposed federal legislation
relating to franchising would be of limited value in light of the
demise of every past attempt. 3 However, the Williams Bill was the
first to be based upon a full scale investigation of franchising,
bringing together an unprecedented collection of franchising statistics and expert opinion. In introducing his carefully drafted proposal before the Senate, Senator Williams concluded:
The only course of action to provide protection for the potential
franchise holder and to restore an ethical balance to franchising
is legislative action at either the State or Federal level
I believe franchising, by its very unique nature, should be
regulated by a properly drawn Federal law. 74
Although his conclusive remarks may have been accepted, the
Williams Bill did not leave the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency in 1970. A companion measure in the House (H.R. 19022)
may have a better chance of survival in Congress.7 5 It is reported
that by providing for the preemption of state laws in the area and
limiting the civil liability of the franchisor to the franchisee's actual
damages, H.R. 19022 is a more politically palatable version of the
basic regulatory scheme set forth in the Williams Bill.76 But, while
full disclosure legislation is still being considered on the federal
level, legislative action on the state level is a fact.
B.

STATE AcTIoN

In 1967, California attempted to correct an accelerating frequency
of fraudulent practices in franchise sales by applying their state

71
72

73
74

an "unfavorable liquidity position and unprofitable operating results," Joe Namath has left Broadway Joe's, Inc. The Wall Street
Journal, Oct. 1, 1970, at 13, col. 3.
S. 3844, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. Schedule A (18) and (19) (1970).
Id. (12) and (17).

Zeidman, supra note 6.
Statement of Senator Harrison Williams, 116 CONG. REC. 7209 (daily
ed. May 15, 1970).

Vs

3 CONTmnENTAL FRANcmsE REv., Sept. 7, 1970, at 2.

78

Id.

COMMENT
securities regulations to the area.77 Because of a complicated qualification test,7 s not all franchise sales were made subject to regulation and state authorities decided that a choice had to be made as
to a more effective regulatory scheme:
Either the definition of security in the California Corporate Securities Law should be expanded to include "franchise" (with
appropriate specific exemptions also being added), or the securities concept should be abandoned and franchises per se should be
subject to some form of review, licensing, permit or qualification
procedure. 79

In November 1969, the California Legislature held hearings "to
determine the nature and extent of the franchise problem in California." 0 The state attorney general's office reported that franchise
fraud had become the biggest problem for their business fraud division.81 Through the combined efforts of legislators, the attorney
general's office, the corporations commissioner's office and the franchising industry, a modified full disclosure bill was drafted, requiring full disclosure and vesting extensive administrative powers in
a state agency. 2 Signed into law on September 18, 1970, the California "Franchise Investment Law" became "the first major piece
of legislation aimed at protecting the consumer from unethical
franchising techniques and practices."8 3
Operative on January 1, 1971, California's law is a comprehensive and forceful example of protective legislation. The basic procedure is for franchisors to register with the commissioner of corporations prior to offering any franchise for sale84 unless specifically
exempted from the registration requirement.8 5 The registration application must disclose relevant information concerning the franchise to be offered, and the same information must be provided in
prospectus form to each prospective franchisee at least forty-eight
hours before a contract is signed or the receipt of any consideration,
whichever occurs first. 86 According to the specific exemption pro77

Augustine & Erusoff, FranchiseRegulation, 21 HAST. L. 01.1347 (1970);
Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchising Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the California Corporation Code, 44 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 555
(1969); Pierno, supra note 34.

78

Pierno, supranote34, at 503.

79 Id. at 504.

80 Statement of Hon. Clark L. Bradley, California State Senator, 1970

Hearings 595.
Id. at 596.
The Knox-Bradley Bill (AB 1309-SB 647) was introduced into the
California Legislature on March 18, 1970.
83 3 CONMTENTAL FRANcMSE REv., Aug. 10, 1970, at 3.
84 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 31110 (West Supp. 1970).
85 Id. § 31100.
86 Id. § 31111.
81
82
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visions, those franchisors that have the required financial backing,
the required experience in franchising, and who disclose essential
information to their franchisees need not register.8 7 Thus, a definition of franchise 88 that is virtually identical to the Williams Bill
definition is narrowed, in effect, by provisions that exempt wellfunded and experienced franchisors from registration with the state
but still require them to disclose specific information to their franchisees.
Going beyond any federal proposal, the California law restricts
the number of individuals who will do the actual selling of the
franchise. Without specific exemption, it will be unlawful for any
individual to sell a franchise in California unless (1) properly
identified in a registration statement, or (2) a licensed real estate
89
broker, or (3) a licensed stock broker.
And, going even farther beyond full disclosure protection, California has vested substantial power in their commissioner of corporations to oversee franchisor-franchisee dealings. The commissioner has the power to summarily suspend or revoke a registration
statement for noncompliance with the law or the commission's rules,
or whenever an unreasonable risk to prospective franchisees is
determined to exist. If it appears that a franchisor will not be able
to fulfill his promises, the commissioner may demand that the franchisee fee be placed in escrow or a survey bond be issued at the
franchisor's option.91 The commissioner is also given the power to
review advertisements prior to publication within the state 2 and
to bring action in the name of the state to enjoin acts or practices
in violation of the law.93 By such conduct, those violating the law,
including nonresidents, are said to have consented to the appoint4
ment of the commissioner as agent to receive service of processY
Any offer or sale in violation of the act will result in the franchisor's being liable for damages, and if the violation is willful
the franchisee may also sue for recision. 5 Any willful violation
will also result in criminal prosecution with penalties of up to ten
years' imprisonment and ten thousand dollar fines, if convicted.96
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COMMENT
On the whole, the California Franchise Investment Law is an
extremely powerful measure. The forcefulness of the legislation
reflects both the seriousness of the franchising problem in California and the peculiar organization and regulatory capability of
California administrative agencies. It is evident that a modified
full disclosure scheme may provide more restraint on franchising
than many states would require and may also create unreasonable
administration problems in other states. However, the basic requirement of a full disclosure of material facts by franchisors
should appeal to states interested in fostering the future development of franchising within their jurisdictions. While it has yet to
prove itself effective, the California law has blazed a trail in franchise regulation that other states and perhaps the federal government may one day follow.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems involved in the offer and sale of franchises today
are reminiscent of those that once plagued the offer and sale of
securities. In both situations, fraudulent representations, material
omissions and self-deceptive dreams of easy money have added up
to misunderstandings, business failure and serious financial loss.
Through a full disclosure requirement, it is hoped that the franchise investor will have the opportunity to objectively evaluate the
investment before obligations are incurred. In other words, merely
requiring the presentation of all material facts should substantially
reduce the risks undertaken by both parties to the franchise contract just as it has reduced risks in purchasing securities.
There seems to be little doubt that the most effective means of
restoring vitality to franchising is through legislation. And there
are several reasons why federal legislation requiring full disclosure
would be the most desirable course of action. First of all, it would
provide uniform regulation specifically designed to deal with
problems peculiar to the franchise relationship. Secondly, effective
federal regulation would make it unnecessary for many states to
take further action. Legislation on the order of that proposed by
Senator Williams would not preempt state regulation but the effects of federal law might foreclose the need for supplemental action by the states. A final reason for favoring federal regulation
is the simple consideration of getting the best possible policing
effort at the least expense. Both the Securities Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission are experienced administrative agencies and either could be adapted to enforcing a franchise
full disclosure requirement. Thus, for elementary reasons, federal
legislation implementing a full disclosure requirement seems to be
the most practical solution to the problems of franchising.
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The proposed Franchise Full Disclosure Act of 1970 offered a
reasonable means of providing franchise investors with the same
type of protection that the federal government has given to securities investors. The failure to enact such legislation is not encouraging. Investigation has shown that deceptive practices in franchising
is a national problem. The magnitude of the problem is exemplified
by the comprehensive nature of California's new law and the proposals that have been considered by other states.97 While Congressional enactment of franchise full disclosure legislation continues to
be delayed, it can be expected that the other fragmented campaigns
to curb abusive practices in franchising will continue. The Federal
Trade Commission will inch toward a full disclosure requirement
in its methodical, case-by-case fashion, and more states will be considering independent action along the lines of that taken by California. But in the meantime, many more disenchanted franchisees
will be wondering where law was when they needed it.
Terry D. Sattler '72
Recipient of the Nebraska Law Review
Best Student Article Award 1971

97 See proposed Massachusetts Franchise Fair Dealing Act (H. 2279)

and proposed New York Franchise Law (S. 8403-A. 5767) in 1970
Hearings 15, 543.

COMMENT
APPENDIX
May 15, 1970 [S. 3844] A bill to require under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission a full and fair disclosure of the
nature of interests in business franchises, and to provide increased protection in the public interest for franchises in the sale of business franchises.
SCHEDULE A
(1) The name of the franchisor, the name under which he intends or is
doing business, and the name of any parent or affiliated company that will
engage in transactions with franchisees.
(2) The name of the State or other soveign [sic] power under which
the franchisor is organized and the location of the franchisor's principal
place of business.
(3) The names and addresses of the directors or persons performing
similar functions and the chief executive, financial, accounting and principal executive officers, chosen or to be chosen, if the franchisor is a corporation, association or other entity; of all partners, if the franchisor is a
partnership, and of the franchisor if the franchisor is an individuaL
(4) A statement disclosing whether any person identified in the registration statement
(a) has been convicted of a felony, or pleaded nolo contendere to
a felony, or been held liable in a civil action by final judgment, if such
felony or civil action involved fraud, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion,
or misappropriation of property; or
(b) is subject to any currently effective order or ruling of any State
or federal agency.
Such statement shall indicate the court, date of conviction or judgment,
or any penalty imposed or damages assessed.
(5) The general character of the business actually transacted by the
franchisor for the past five years, and the business to be transacted by the
franchisor.
(6) Recent financial statements of the franchisor. The Commission may
by rule or regulation prescribe the form and content of financial statements required under this Act, the circumstances under which consolidated
financial statements may be filed, and the circumstances under which financial statements shall be certified by independent certified public accountants or public accountants.
(7) A copy of the franchise agreement proposed to be used.
(8) A statement of the franchise fee charged, the proposed application
of the proceeds of such fee by the franchisor, and the formula by which
the amount of the fee is determined if the fee is not the same in all cases.
(9) A statement describing any payments or fees other than franchise
fees that the franchisee or subfranchisor is required to pay to the franchisor, including royalties and payments or fees which the franchisor collects in whole or in part on behalf of third parties.
(10) A statement of the conditions under which the franchise agreement may be terminated or renewal refused, or repurchased at the option
of the franchisor.
(11) A statement as to whether, by the terms of the franchise agreement or by other device or practice, the franchisee or subfranchisor is required to purchase from the franchisor or his designee services, supplies,
products, fixtures, or other goods relating to the establishment or operation of the franchise business, together with a description thereof.
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(12) A statement as to whether, by the terms of the franchise agreement or other device or practice, the franchisee is limited in the goods or
services offered by him to his customers.
(13) A statement of the terms and conditions of any financial arrangements when offered directly or indirectly by the franchisor or his agent.
(14) A statement of any past or present practice or of any intent of
the franchisor to sell, assign, or discount to a third party any note, contract, or other obligation of the franchisee in whole or in part.
(15) A statement of available earnings of past and present franchises.
(16T A statement of the number of franchises presently operating and
proposed to be sold.
(17) A statement as to whether franchisees and subfranchisors receive
an exclusive area or territory.
(18) A statement setting forth such other information as the Commission may require.
(19) A statement setting forth such information as the franchisor may
desire to present.
(20) A statement of any compensation or other benefit given or promised to a public figure arising, in whole or in part, from the use of the
public figure in the name or symbol of the franchise.
(21) When the person filing the registration statement is a subfranchisor, the statement shall include the same information concerning the
subfranchisor as is required from the franchisor pursuant to this schedule.

